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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
finally, on appeal the correct result was reached, but for
the wrong reason, after the trial court had declined to
reach the correct result for any reason. Sic gloria transit
mundi!
CLAIM FOR SALVAGE AWARD BY MEMBER OF
CREW OF LIBERTY SHIP
Drevas v. United States, War Shipping Administration,
United States Maritime Service'
Libelant was a member of the crew of the Liberty ship,
Matt W. Ransom, which was carrying munitions bound for
Casablanca on February 25, 1943. The crew numbered
forty-four; the total ship's company was seventy-seven.
On April 11, 1943, the ship was either hit by a submarine
torpedo or struck a mine about eighty miles from Casa-
blanca. A hole 14 by 15 feet was torn in the starboard
bow. The hole filled with water, and the stern rose up
about four feet. The propeller was not out of water and
the deck was above water four or five feet. The ship
settled. The master than ordered all hands into boats, and
the order was obeyed by all. On leaving, the master's
orders were to stand by in the boats. Libelant was in the
master's boat along with several other crew members.
After one half hour the master saw that the ship was no
longer sinking and asked the boat's company if they were
willing to go back and try to bring the ship into port.
The members of four other life boats were not asked to
return to the ship. The ship was safely taken to Casa-
blanca. The crew was paid off and the ship repaired.
Libelant claimed that he was entitled to salvage. The Dis-
trict Court, following a long line of similar and even
stronger cases, found that Drevas was not entitled to such
award.
The problem presented by this case is not a new one,
but it had never before been raised directly in this juris-
diction. The general rule, that a member of a crew can-
not ordinarily recover an award for salvage was reiterated
in the Eastern Shore.2 There the question was not, as in
the present case, whether the crew member had been dis-
charged from the service of the ship, or whether the ship
had been abandoned, but whether libelant was a member
of the crew of the particular ship at all. In the Eastern
1 D. C., D. Md., February 9, 1945.
215 F. (2d) 82, 1926 A. M. C. 899 (D. C., D. Md. 1926).
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Shore, the same owner owned two ferryboats. During the
summer both were operated. In winter only one crew
was employed, and the two boats were operated alter-
nately; the crew being transferred from one to the other.
When libelant had returned from a trip on one boat, dur-
ing the winter, he saw the other afire, and successfully
assisted in salving it, claiming salvage therefor. The Court
found that the crew was attached to both vessels in such
a sense that its members could not recover for salvage
services rendered to either.
In order to support a claim for salvage, four prerequi-
sites must be met. There must be (1) maritime property,
(2) in peril, (3) successfully salved, and, (4) voluntarily
by one under no legal duty.3
In cases like the instant one, the first three require-
ments have been fulfilled. The difficulty lies in drawing
the line of demarcation between one who is under a legal
duty and one who has either never been under such duty
or whose obligation has terminated, by his discharge or by
the abandonment of the ship.
The history of the present attitude of the courts toward
salvage may be developed by the discussion of a few cases
and the resulting legislation.
Before the Act of June, 1872, when a vessel was ship-
wrecked or otherwise disabled before the termination of
the voyage, seamen's wages ceased with the cessation of
their service. The hardship wrought by this state of af-
fairs was somewhat alleviated by the general rules pro-
viding for the award of lost wages to seamen who, in the
event of disaster, returned to the ship and rescued her.
It was such a return of lost wages that was given to libelant
for service performed in the Neptune.' Under the old law,
the seaman was equally well off financially whether the
ship successfully completed her voyage or whether she was
shipwrecked and he salved her. In either case, he received
his wages or the equivalent, and nothing more.
Under the theory of salvage, he may recover not only
his wages, but a further sum. Such a situation is apt to
be a temptation to a seaman to place the ship in a position
of danger, or to treat lightly his responsibility to safeguard
her. As was said in the Neptune, supra: "In a salvage case
you must take into consideration the quantum of personal
danger incurred, the value of property saved, and other
circumstances which may influence the demand of salvage,
'RoBiNsox, ADMIRALTY (1939) 709.
1 Hagg. Adm. 237.
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whereas the rule of wages presents only a stipulated sum
which in no case can be exceeded. By the same rule, every
temptation to throw the ship into situations of danger with
a view to an extravagant salvage is effectually removed;
for no increase of danger can bring to the mariner an in-
crease of profit."
In the Two Catherines,5 libelant was awarded not sal-
vage, but wages based on his successful saving of valuable
property after termination of his obligation to that prop-
erty or cargo. There is, as we have seen, a distinction be-
tween an award for salvage, such as that sought in the
Drevas case, and the recovery of lost wages by the crew
under the old law which caused seamen's wages to cease
upon total loss of the vessel.
The Act of June 7, 1872,6 eliminates the problem of the
Neptune and the Two Catherines and leaves the only re-
ward open to seamen that of salvage:
"No right to wages shall be dependent on the earn-
ing of freight by the vessel, but every seaman or ap-
prentice who would be entitled to demand and receive
any wages if the vessel on which he has served had
earned freight, shall-be entitled to claim and recover
the same of the master or owner in personam, notwith-
standing that freight has not been earned. But in all
cases of wreck or loss of vessel, proof that any seaman
or apprentice has not exerted himself to the utmost to
save the vessel, cargo and stores shall bar his claim.
"In cases where the service of any seaman termi-
nated before the period contemplated in the agree-
ment, by reason of the loss or wreck of the vessel, such
seaman shall be entitled to wages for the time of ser-
vice prior to such termination, but not for any further
period. * * *"
Under the theory of the Neptune courts have been slow
and reluctant to award salvage to crew members. There
are a few recognized exceptions to the general rule, which
exceptions are discussed fully and in great detail in the
C. P. Minch.7 This case arose out of a libel by two mem-
bers of a crew for salvage. The Court, after reviewing the
history of cases of this type, recognized three possible ex-
ceptions under which salvage awards might be made to
crew members.
'2 Mason. 319, Fed. Cas. No. 14,288 (1821).
'U. S. C., Tit. 46, Sees. 592, 593.
7 73 F. 859 (1896).
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These are (1) where the voyage has terminated by the
shipwreck of the vessel; (2) where the vessel has been
abandoned by all or by all except the salvors, under circum-
stances which show conclusively that the abandonment
was absolute, without hope or expectation of recovery;
or (3) where the seaman has by the master been unmis-
takably discharged from the service of the shipowner.
It is indeed a rare and exceptional case which has per-
mitted recovery for salvage by a member of the crew of a
ship. A leading case cited by libelant in this type of claim
is Hobart vs. Drogan (The Hope) .8 That case was one,
not in which a member of the crew claimed salvage, but,
rather, where libelant was a pilot, wholly disconnected
with the ship as a member of its regular crew, and was
merely a temporary member of the crew for a particular
purpose. The language used by the Court in The Hope,
was: "Seamen, in the ordinary course of things, in the
performance of their duties, are not allowed to become
salvors, whatever may have been the peril or hardships or
gallantry of their services in saving the ship and cargo.
We say in the ordinary for extraordinary events may occur
in which their connections with the ship may be dissolved
de facto, or by operation of law, or they may exceed their
proper duty, in which case they may be permitted to claim
as salvors."
The cases in which the court has considered the above
doctrine have been many. The cases which are so extra-
ordinary and unusual as to bring them within the meaning
of the exceptions are few. There are four leading cases
in which recovery was permitted. All four were based on
the theory that the ship had been abandoned, which is
the theory libelant based his claim upon in the case under
consideration.
It may be clearly seen, by the facts in the following
cases, that the abandonment was unquestionable, absolute
and complete, as distinguished from the facts of the case
now under discussion.
The most recent decision, and the one which may be
most effectively contrasted with the Drevas case, is the
English case of the San Demetrio.9 In the San Demetrio,
the libel also originated by enemy action in the present
war. The chief distinction between that case and this is
that the master, in the San Demetrio, specifically gave the
order to abandon ship, whereas in the Drevas case, the
8 10 Pet. 108 (U. S. 1836).
9 Adm. Div. (Jan. 16 & 17, 1941) Lloyd's List Law Rep. Vol. 69, 5.
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master ordered the crew to stand by in life boats. The
San Demetrio was a stronger case on its facts, also. There,
one-fourth of the total crew returned to the ship, which
was carrying petrol, and which had been in flames for
hours. These discharged crew members worked tirelessly
for seven or eight days, one of their number lost his life,
and the others assumed extreme risks. As a result, they
succeeded in salving almost the entire cargo of petrol. In
granting an award to the salvors, the Court said: "This
class of salvage is, necessarily, of a rare character. It is
not often that seamen are called upon to salve their own
vessel. The law on the matter was laid down with great
strictness as long ago as the time of Dr. Lushington, and the
law is not in doubt. Four requisites laid down by Dr.
Lushington, 1° have to be fulfilled before seamen can be al-
lowed to claim salvage in respect of their own vessel. The
chief of these requisites is that the ship was properly
abandoned under the orders of her master. In the pres-
ent case there has never been the slightest shadow of a
doubt that all four requisites have been adequately ful-
filled. The abandonment of this ship was not only a wise
and proper act, it was the only possible course that could
have been adopted by the master. Moreover, it is clear
that at the time when the vessel was abandoned no one
had the slightest hope of returning to her; in fact, no one
had the smallest expectation of seeing her again."
In the Florence," the ship was abandoned by order of
the master. The crew boarded a steamer, landed, were
put by the British Consul aboard another steamer bound
for England. Subsequently they met up with the derelict.
Some of the crew volunteered to return to her, and suc-
ceeded in bringing her into port. The Court, in that situa-
tion, found that there had been such unconditional abandon-
ment as would justify a recovery for salvage.
In the Triumph,12 the vessel was in a collision off Cape
Cod. The master and all the crew except the cook rushed
onto another vessel. The cook had been asleep and awoke
too late to be rescued. He stayed aboard rigged the pump,
found the leak, patched it up and managed to navigate the
vessel until help arrived. The Court there found that the
cook was entitled to salvage.
11Florence (1852) 16 Jur. 572: Abandonment must (1) take place at sea
and not upon a coast; (2) be sine spe revertendi; (3) be bona fide for the
purpose of saving life; and (4) be by order of the master, in consequence
of danger by reason of damage to the ship and the state of the elements.
21 Ibid.
"' Spr. 428, Fed. Cas. No. 14,183 (1858).
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In the Georgiana,13 a fishing vessel ran aground. The
crew left and the master told them "it was all off". Three
of the crew later returned to the vessel and kept her afloat,
thereby enabling her to be rescued and returned to port
in reparable condition. The Court, in its opinion, said:
"But, as soon as the members of such a crew are discharged
from their agreed service, whether formally or expressly,
or by implication from the circumstances, and have been
thus released from any obligation to exert themselves for
the benefit of the vessel, or property on board her, their
previous connection with the vessel does not prevent their
becoming salvors in respect of any such exertions. The
District Court has found that this vessel was finally aban-
doned when her master and crew left her aground * * *
and that the men on board were thereafter released from
further obligation to her."
The majority of cases which have arisen subsequent to
the passage of the acts entitling seamen to wages, have
denied any further award. One'of the strongest cases is
the Tashmoo.14 There libelant was a workaway, who,
through his skill as a radio operator, saved the ship from
disaster. The Court denied salvage, on the theory that
even though libelant was a workaway, he was a member
of the crew for the purpose of that trip, and was therefore
under a duty to exercise the utmost diligence. Salvage
was also denied in situations similar to that of Drevas in
the cases of the Warrior,15 the Macona, 16 the Mary M., 17 the
C. F. Bielman,18 and the Elk. 9
This decision, arising under wartime conditions, when
acts of heroism far beyond line of duty are being performed
by members of all the armed services, as well as by sea-
men, seems particularly justifiable. It would be mani-
festly inequitable to permit seamen additional compensa-
tion for acts beyond line of duty, when such awards are
denied to members of the armed forces, and when the
seamen are adequately provided for by legislation, unless
the acts are so obviously exclusive of the seaman's duty to
his ship that there can be no possible doubt as to his merit-
ing an additional reward, as was clearly indicated by the
facts in San Demetrio, supra.
"a 245 F. 321 (C. C. A. 1st, 1917).
" 48 F. (2d) 366, 1931 A. M. C. 48 (1930).
15 Lushington's Rep. 476, 167 Eng. Repr. 214 (1862).
"6 269 F. 468 (1920).
17 1938 A. M. C. 1237 (1938).
"108 F. 878, 121 F. 540 (1901).
"1938 A. M. C. 714 (1938).
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